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an orthodox model: 
Chile, 1973-1978 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis* 
Many developing countries have been applying 
export promotion policies during, the last fifteen 
years. Among them, mention may be made-of Brazil, 
Colombia, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Yugoslavia. The condi-
tions, timing, mechanisms and effects differ from 
one case to another and cover a broad range of 
political and economic models. The variety display-
ed by the various kinds of past experience show 
above all that export promotion is not exclusively 
l inked to a given model. 
This article examines the most outstanding 
aspects of export promotion in Chile between 1973 
and 1978, analyses the influence which various 
structural and conjunctural aspects of the Chilean 
economy have had on the composition and level of 
exports, and examines some repercussions on the 
development of domestic industry. 
Section I sets out the main aspects of the 
external trade policies applied between 1973 and 
1978. The next section studies in detail the evolution 
of exports by categories of products and market 
destination; the analysis is extended to cover the 
period 1965-1978 with the aim of giving a broader 
perspective for appraising the expansion of the 
sector. In section III , an examination is made of the 
economic framework in which the expansion of non-
traditional exports has been achieved and the effects 
which some of these exports have had on the national 
economy. On the basis of this information, a brief 
comparison is made with the experiences of other 
countries. Finally, section IV gives some brief 
conclusions and outlines an alternative strategy 
which could satisfy national needs more efficiently. 
* Researcher of the Latin American Economic Research 
Corporation (CIEPLAN). An earlier version of this article 
was presented at the Informal Meeting on Industrialization 
and Development organized by CEPAL in October 1978 in 
Santiago, Chile, and published in Vierteljahresberichte, 
N.° 75, March 1979. The author wishes to express his grati-
tude for the support received from the Latin American. 
Committee of the Social Science Research Council, the 
valuable aid of J. Marshall and J. Scherman, and the 
comments of many colleagues. The views and interpreta-
tion contained in this study are, of course, exclusively the 
responsibility of the author. 
I 
The external trade policy 
and its most oustanding 
characteristics 
The economic policy which has been in force 
in Chile since 1973 assigns a predominant role 
to the expansion of exports. Chilean policy in 
these years has been extremely orthodox, tor it 
has involved the drastic liberalization of im-
ports, an unrestricted opening-up to foreign 
investment, and a pronounced anti-State ap-
proach expressed in abstention from direct in-
tervention in production activities and in the 
"neutrality" of indirect economic policies, all 
within the context of profound faith in the com-
petitive functioning of the market. These two 
lines have been followed systematically during 
the five years for which the present model has 
been applied.1 
Non-traditional exports have increased 
significantly, leading some observers to speak 
of a new case of economic expansion after the 
style of South Korea. The conditions sur-
rounding the two cases are, however, very dif-
ferent, and the prospects seem to be even more 
dissimilar, especially as regards the industrial 
sector. 
The most noteworthy characteristic of the 
present external trade policy, is its marked 
movement towards free trade, through which it 
endeavours to attain a situation in which inter-
national prices (of goods tradeable with the 
exterior) prevail in the whole of the national 
economy, there is free entry and exit of capital, 
and the exchange rate is determined by the 
market. The external trade policy thus coin-
cides with the general tone of the entire eco-
nomic programme, which seeks to minimize 
the State's participation in economic activities. 
1. The principal measures 
The central element of the external trade 
policy has undoubtedly been the drastic 
The apparent "neutrality" has been applied within a 
context of inequality in the various fields of national 
activity, and the predictable result has been a notably 
greater concentration of power and wealth. 
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reduction in the high tariff protection which 
import substitution enjoyed when the new 
régime took over. The goal of the liberalization 
process has undergone significant changes 
during the application of this process, how-
ever; thus in mid-1974 the maximum target 
tariff contemplated by the liberalization policy 
was 60%,2 but towards the end of that year it 
Apparently, according to repeated official 
statements, the process of reducing the protec-
tion for import substitution should have 
terminated in August 1977, when the tariffs 
stood, with only a few exceptions, at between 
35% and 10%, but three months later the 
Ministry of Finance announced another 
change of policy which consisted in reducing 
the tariffs even more with the aim of arriving 
at a uniform rate of 10% by mid-1979. This is an 
unusually low rate for a developing country, 
and its total lack of selectivity is exceptional 
even for the most developed countries of the 
world.4 In reality, tariffs of this type are usually 
proposed only in the most orthodox texts on 
international economics. 
2University of Chile, Taller de Coyuntura, N.° 13, 
September 1974, p. 29. 
3S. de la Cuadra, "Estrategias de liberación del 
comercio exterior chileno" in Banco Central de Chile, 
Estudios Monetarios IV, 1976, section V. 
4Details on the tariffs in force in South Korea in 1976 
and the aims of a tariff reduction process which was in the 
course of preparation are given in B. Balassa, "Incentives 
for economic growth in Korea", in Policy reform in 
developing countries (New York, Pergamon Press, 1977), 
pp. 148-151. Details on non-tariff restrictions and tariff 
dispersion applied by the United States, Japan and the 
was hinted that the maximum tariff accepted in 
the future would be only 30%,3 and a little 
afterwards a maximum target tariff of 35% was 
formally established, which is the tariff that 
served as a guide for the successive tariff 
reductions carried out up to 1977, as shown in 
table 1. 
Exports were promoted in three ways: 
through an increase in the real effective 
exchange rate; through the promotional work 
of a public institution called PROCHILE, 
and through such incentives as the reimburse-
ment of the value added tax (IVA).5 
Indirectly, the expansion of exports has 
been helped by the drastic reduction in total 
domestic demand brought about by the 
economic policy: a phenomenon which was 
particularly intense in 1975, when the rate of 
open unemployment rose to 20% and manufac-
turing output went down by 24%. 
The exchange rate rose appreciably during 
1974 and 1975, and within the context of a 
depressed domestic economy (a situation 
European Community to products of interest for Latin 
America are given in P. Mendive, "Protectionism and 
development: New obstacles of the centres to international 
trade", in CEPAL Review N.° 6, second half of 1978. 
5Two other instruments —export credits and reduc-
tions in the ex-customs cost of imported components— 
were of less relative significance. The reimbursement 
of the value added tax, which is effected by varying the 
application of this tax according to the destination of the 
goods, is compatible with the "neutrality" of the economic 
policy. 
Table 1 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION, 1973-1979 
(Customs duties on CIF value) 
12/73 6/74 8/75 2/76 8/77 7/79 
Maximum rate ^220% 140% 90% 80% 35% 10% 
Most frequent rate 90% 60% 40% 35% 20% 10% 
Average rate 94% 67% 44% 38% 18% 10% 
Source: Central Bank. The dates given in the table correspond to the first and last decrees establishing tariff reductions, 
with 4 of the 10 intervening decrees. The rates quoted do not include the special exceptions, which mostly 
refer to the automotive sector. 
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which was notably accentuated from the 
second half of 1974 onwards) this facilitated 
the disposal abroad of a growing proportion of 
national production. At the same time, 
PROCHILE carried out promotional and 
information work which helped to strengthen 
an export-oriented mentality among business-
men and to open up new markets abroad; 
these efforts received decisive support during 
the entire period that Chile belonged to the 
Andean Pact, an integration grouping with five 
other South American countries6 which until 
1976 constituted the main destination for 
increased non-traditional exports (see table 8). 
In addition, incentives were established such 
as the reimbursement of the value added tax 
paid on inputs and exemption from payment 
of this tax on the exports themselves, while 
more recently generalized tariff exemptions 
have been introduced in respect of imports of 
inputs to be used in the manufacture of goods 
for export. 
The exchange policy covers the fixing of 
the exchange rate and the rules for access to 
the foreign exchange market. On repeated 
occasions, various leading personalities in the 
economic team have stressed the desirability 
of adopting an exchange rate policy free of 
State intervention in both aspects. During the 
last five years, however, an exchange rate 
administered by the Central Bank has been 
maintained, and some restrictions on access to 
the foreing exchange market still remain. Thus, 
the foreing exchange policy constitutes the 
main deviation —and perhaps the only impor-
tant one— of the present economic policy from 
the traditional recipes given in orthodox eco-
nomics texts. 
Up to mid-1976 the exchange rate was 
adjusted two or three times a month. From 
July of that year, however, the changes were 
made daily and were announced monthly in 
advance. This system was maintained up to 
February 1978, when a table of daily changes 
was published for the rest of that year. The 
size and direction of the changes have varied 
over the last five years. In a first stage the size 
of the mini-devaluations was such that it 
enabled the real exchange rate to go up consid-
erably, as may be seen from column 2 of table 2. 
From the beginning of 1976, however, this 
tendency was reversed, and in June 1976 and 
March 1977 there were even two devaluations 
which led to sharp reductions in the real 
exchange rate amounting in total to a deteriora-
tion of the order of 25% in this period.7 After a 
few months, however, an opposite policy was 
adopted which involved two successive 
devaluations leading to a partial recovery of the 
real level reached in 1976. Consequently, the 
evolution of the real price of the dollar in 
Chile has been unstable and has caused 
fluctuations in the relative profitability of 
exports. 
In the foreign exchange field it should 
also be noted that there has been a progressive 
Table 2 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 





































Note: The nominal exchange rate (in pesos per dollar) 
was deflated by a simple average of the consumer 
price index and the domestic component of the 
wholesale price index, and inflated by an index of 
external prices, the base of both indexes being 100 
for the 1977 average. The methodology for estima-
ting the index of external prices is described in R. 
Ffrench-Davis, Políticas económicas en Chile, 
1952-1970 (Santiago, Chile, Editorial Nueva Uni-
versidad, 1973), appendix 1. The dates correspond 
to changes in exchange policy. 
6An examination of the main characteristics and 
implications oí the Andean Pact (Cartagena Agreement) 
was made in R. Ffrench-Davis, "E l Pacto Andino: un 
modelo original de integración", in E. Tironi, éd., Pacto 
Andino: carácter y perspectivas, Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, Lima, 1978. 
7 T h e results are extremely sensitive to the index of 
domestic prices used as a deflator, especially during 1974. 
Here , the combined index described in the note to table 2 
was used. 
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liberalization of access to the purchase of 
foreign exchange. This is reflected, for 
example, in the increase in the foreing ex-
change allowance available to Chilean tourists 
and the reduction of controls on obtaining 
foreign exchange to pay for imports. Certain 
controls still remain, however, on the contrac-
ting of debts abroad and the purchase and sale 
of foreign currency. 
2. Trade expansion and the balance 
of payments 
As already noted, trade with the exterior has 
been affected by a number of economic policy 
measures. Let us now see what effects these 
have had on the volume of trade. 
Practically all trade operations with the 
exterior have expanded during the last five 
years, particularly in the fields of imports and 
non-traditional exports. The most notable 
exception is the low real level of imports of 
machinery and equipment. 
In the field of imports, the behaviour of 
the different categories of goods is very 
heterogeneous. 
Imports of machinery and equipment 
show a decline of over 15% between 1970 and 
1978. These imports not only went down 
compared with other purchases abroad (their 
share in total imports dropped from 20% to 
12%), but also fell in absolute terms (measured 
in dollars of constant purchasing power). This 
deterioration reflects the scanty investment 
which has accompanied the present economic 
policy, since domestic production of capital 
goods also went down during this time. 
In contrast, imports of non-food consumer 
goods —a category which includes most, if not 
all, imports of luxury goods— rose by 112% and 
accounted for 15% of total imports in 1978, i.e., 
more than total imports of machinery and 
equipment. 
To sum up, then, Chile is now importing 
on a large scale many kinds of goods which 
domestic industry had been supplying to an 
increasing extent for decades past, and a large 
proportion of these "non-traditional imports" 
have taken the place of domestic products 
which, in normal conditions ("reasonable" 
levels of protection and a level of total demand 
which is not depressed), could be manufac-
tured efficiently. This topic, however, like 
those of imports of luxury goods and the most 
efficient way of replacing those types of pro-
duction which really were inefficient, will not 
be tackled here so that we may return without 
delay to the consideration of the topic of 
exports. 
Non-traditional exports underwent a 
marked expansion, which was particularly 
noteworthy in 1975 and part of 1976, in spite of 
the recession on international markets. With 
the notable exception of some agricultural 
products and one mining product, however, 
most of the non-traditional exports have shown 
some slackening of their growth rate from the 
second half of 1976 onwards (see table 4). This 
is explained by four factors: the recent reactiva-
tion of domestic demand, the withdrawal from 
the Andean Pact, the exchange rate revalua-
tions, and the extremely low rate of domestic 
investment. All these factors have joined 
together to operate simultaneously as a brake 
on the sustained expansion of non-traditional 
exports. We shall return to this topic in the next 
section. 
Table 3 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1977-1978 




Interest and profits 
Others (freight charges, 
tourism, etc.) 

























Source: Central Bank of Chile. The figures correspond to 
an estimate based on figures given in the Boletín 
Mensual, June 1979, and data on external trade 
indicators of the same date. The nominal price of 
copper in 1977 and 1978 was 59.3 and 61.9 US 
cents per pound, respectively. 
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The balance of payments showed deficits 
on the trade and current accounts in both 1977 
and 1978, and both these deficits show a 
tendency to increase. Obviously, however, 
their future size will depend on the evolution 
of the price of copper and the way in which the 
economic policies which most directly influ-
ence the behaviour of the external sector are 
applied: the design of policies relating to total 
demand, level of investments, industrial 
development strategy, exchange rate, tariffs, 
etc., will have a decisive influence here. 
In spite of these deficits, the Central Bank 
accumulated a high level of gross international 
reserves in 1977 and large gross and net 
reserves in 1978. This was due to an extraor-
dinary inflow of financial funds (above all 
from banks) which came to more than double 
In this section the behaviour of Chilean exports 
between 1965 and 1978 will be examined from 
three angles. Firstly, their evolution will be 
analysed according to whether the exports are 
traditional or new; secondly, the contribution 
of the industrial sector to exports will be 
examined, and lastly, the available information 
will be broken down according to markets of 
destination. Since world inflation was signifi-
cant during the period studied, all the mone-
tary values will be expressed in terms of 
constant purchasing power.8 
The breakdown by categories of products 
and by markets of destination, together with 
the correction for the devaluation of the dollar, 
**It should be noted that we are speaking oí real values 
and not the volume of exports. The index of'external prices 
used in this study shows that the prices in the industria-
lized countries doubled between 1970 and 1977 and 
increased by a factor of 2.59 between 1965 and 1978. This 
index was constructed on the basis of the export unit prices 
of the countries which are most representative in trade with 
Chi le . A comparison of the results given by different 
indexes appears in "Índice de precios externos y valor real 
del comercio international de Chile", CIEPLAN, Santiago, 
Notas Técnicas, N.° 15, April 1979. 
the amortization payments on the external debt 
scheduled for 1978. Part of the surplus was 
tapped by the Central Bank, which thus in-
creased its international reserves, while the 
remainder of this greater gross indebtedness 
on the part of Chile was used to cover the 
growing expenditure on imports and the 
consequents balance-of-payments current 
account deficit. 
Direct foreign investment has recorded 
minimal levels during the five-year period, in 
spite of the adoption of increasingly favourable 
rules for foreign capital. Even in 1978, when 
the total amount was more significant, the net 
investment still represented only one-fifth of 
the external saving received by Chile, and 
most of that corresponded to the purchase by 
Exxon of a Chilean copper mining company. 
make it possible to evaluate more accurately 
the actual evolution of exports and to identify 
the variety of tendencies shown by their 
various components. 
1. Non-traditional exports 
The exports of developing countries are fre-
quently classified as "traditional" and "new", 
or "major" and "minor". The classification is 
naturally an arbitrary one. In the case of Chile, 
up to 1973 the traditional exports comprised 
cooper, molybdenum, iron ore, nitrates and 
iodine, all of which are products of mining 
origin. Public agencies now also include in this 
category fish meal, paper, wood pulp and pa-
perboard, which are products whose export 
was developed intensively during the previous 
decade. Non-traditional exports cover all other 
products.9 
9 T h e s e other products include such items as lentils 
and wool, which have been exported for many years past, 
but on a much smaller scale than the exports classified as 
traditional. 
II 
Composition and level of exports 
Table 4 
EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars at 1977 prices) 
Years Half-years 








I. Traditional exports* 
Coppe r 
I I . Semi-traditional exports** 
1 367.6 1 897.0 2 257.1 
(1 075.3) (1 672.9) (2 070.2) 





































































































































Source: "Est ructura y destino de las exportaciones chilenas: 1965-78" (mimeo), 
(Santiago, Chi le , CIEPLAN, March 1979). The figures for non-traditional 
exports u p to the first half of 1976 are from the Department of Customs and the 
balance-of-payments reports of the Central Bank, while from the second half 
of 1976 they are from the Central Bank's records of shipments. 
^Comprise copper , molybdenum, other copper by-products, iron ore, nitrates and 
iodine. 
^Comprise fish meal, paper, paperboard and wood pulp. 
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In this study we will use three categories: 
(i) traditional exports, corresponding to the 
definition used in the 1960s, plus various by-
products of copper production (such as sele-
nium, gold and silver); (ii) semi-traditional 
exports, which comprise the most dynamic 
products of the 1960s (paper, paperboard, 
wood pulp and fish meal), and (iii) non-tradi-
tional exports, covering the rest of the products 
exported. 
Total exports have undergone pronounced 
ups and downs from one year to another, 
closely linked to the variations in the price of 
copper, which has been the main Chilean 
export throughout the period.10 
Leaving aside the fluctuations recorded, 
Chilean exports have shown a marked increase 
in the non-traditional categories, as may be 
seen from table 4, and their share in the gross 
domestic product (GDP) rose by 3 points 
be tween 1970 and 1977M As a result, total 
exports came to 18% of the GDP in 1977. 
In recent years, it has been common 
practice to measure the expansion of non-tradi-
tional exports with respect to 1973. This gives 
an erroneous view of the matter, however, 
since in the years 1972 and 1973 sales abroad 
were at abnormally low levels which under-
estimate the country's export capacity. This 
capacity is more adequately illustrated by the 
real exports recorded in 1970 or 1971. In order 
to give a broader view, table 4 also includes 
figures for 1965, so as to reveal whether non-
traditional exports showed some dynamism 
before the present experience. Within this 
category, the four items which were most 
l ( lThe figures expressed in constant purchasing power 
are corrected tor the devaluation of the dollar, but this does 
not eliminate the elects oí real fluctuations in the prices of 
the various export items. The real price of copper was quite 
high in 1968-1970, after which it was below normal levels 
until mid-1973; during the first year of the present régime it 
reached unprecedented maximum levels, but during the 
last four years it has fluctuated around levels which may 
be estimated at between 15 and 25% below the normal. 
HThe G D P was estimated at US$ 14,500 million and 
the total value of exports was recalculated, replacing the 
actual value ot copper exports by the normalized value, 
for which purpose a price of 80 US cents per pound of 
electrolytic copper was used, this being considered a 
normal value for 1977. This calculation gives a level of 
exports US$ 400 million higher than the value actually 
recorded in that year. 
important at the end of the period being 
studied have been separated out: fresh fruit, 
Monterey pine, semi-manufactured copper and 
molybdenum oxide. Separate figures are also 
given for exports of sugar, which involve the 
refining of imported raw material and were 
begun in 1975 but subsequently underwent 
large fluctuations.12 Finally, the "Others" 
heading, which covers the rest of non-tradi-
tional exports, comprises many hundreds of 
articles as diverse as lentils and boilers. Table 
5 shows the annual rates of variation of the 
items dealt with in the previous table. 
The information set forth in these two 
tables shows that significant growth rates had 
already been recorded before 1974. Thus, 
although the total amount was only small, non-
traditional exports grew at the rate of 10% per 
year between 1965 and 1970, while the 
"Others" group grew at the rate of 12%. The 
expansion of exports of manufactures was even 
greater, as we shall see later. Consequently, 
the export sector was already showing some 
dynamism before the application of the present 
model. 
In 1971 many export lines continued their 
expansive tendency but non-traditional exports 
as a whole recorded a level similar to that of the 
year before. The prolonged freezing of the 
nominal exchange rate and a persistent in-
crease in total demand helped to explain the 
generalized contraction in non-copper exports 
in the following two years. This tendency was 
drastically reversed when the present eco-
nomic model began to be put into effect. 
Between the end of 1973 and 1976, the expan-
sion in sales abroad was very pronounced: 
many new lines of exports appeared during this 
period, and there was a generalized increase 
in the various non-traditional lines. The overall 
growth continued in subsequent years, al-
though at a more moderate and diminishing 
rate. 
Finally, trends differ between different 
products. Table 4 shows that the rapid expan-
sion of exports continued until 1978 in the case 
of three items, namely fresh fruit (mainly 
grapes and apples), Monterey pine (round-
1 2 The figures for exports include the gross FOB value 
of sales ot sugar, which is classified as a manufacture. 
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Table 5 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF MAIN EXPORTS 
(Real variation, per cent) 
I. Traditional Exports 
Copper 
II. Semi-traditional exports 







































































































Source: Table 4. 
«Annual cumulative rate. 
b
 Total rate of variation with respect to an estimate of the "national export capacity" existing in 1973. This capacity was 
calculated on the basis of the actual exports recorded in 1970 and 1971, selecting the values considered to be most 
"normal" in each year. When the "export capacity" coincides with the real actual value for 1970, only one rate is given for 
each item, but when the values do not coincide, the total rate of variation between 1970 and 1974 is also shown, and is 
marked with an asterisk. The "export capacity" was estimated in a very conservative manner, so it tends to over-estimate 
the growth rate of exports during the period considered. 
wood and simply worked wood) and molyb-
denum oxide. In contrast, the growth rate of the 
rest of the non-traditional exports ("Others") 
fell off considerably after 1976 and was prac-
tically stagnant during the last 11/2 years of the 
period.13 If the information is broken down by 
half-yearly periods, as in tables 4 and 5, the 
stagnation recorded in the last three half-year 
periods can be seen very clearly. 
To sump up, then, some export items of 
primary sector origin continue to grow rapidly, 
while the remainder seem to have grown at a 
definitely slower rate after 1976. It should be 
noted that while in the "Others" group there 
are many items which continue to expand, 
there are also many which went down in the 
course of the last four half-year periods covered 
by this study. In this context, it is the continued 
increase of three items based on natural re-
sources {fruit, wood and molybdenum oxide) 
which explain why non-traditional exports as a 
whole still show appreciable growth rates up to 
the present, although these rates show a 
marked slackening compared with 1974-1976. 
J3The rate of change depends on the definition 
adopted for the "Others" group. If molybdenum oxide is 
included, the 1978 growth rate rises to 6.6%, while if semi-
manufactured copper is included instead the rate drops to 
—2.3%. 
2. Industrial exports 
In the foregoing classification, mining and 
agricultural exports are mixed with exports of 
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manufactures.14 Table 6, however, concen-
trates on exports of industrial origin, classified 
in accordance with the ISIC definition. Sepa-
rate figures are given for the six main items, all 
of them strongly base on natural resources 
which are abundant in Chile. Two of them, 
however —paper and wood pulp— involve 
significant manufacturing processes, although 
most of the production capacity existing in 1978 
for these items was constructed or begun in the 
previous decade. As regards another two 
important items— fish meal and semi-manu-
factured copper— it will be noted that the value 
of exports of these items fluctuates very con-
siderably. In the case offish meal, the fluctua-
tions are due to the unforeseeable changes 
which take place in the availability of raw 
material (mainly anchoveta) and the pro-
nounced variations in world prices. The latter 
factor also affects semi-manufactured copper 
and most of the exports based on natural 
resources. As far as molybdenum oxide is 
concerned, there have been more recent 
increases in production capacity. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that the value added 
to molybdenum concentrate, a by-product of 
copper obtained by CODELCO, is normally 
less than 10% of the gross value.15 Moreover, 
the price of both these products increased by 
more than 50% in real terms between 1974 
and mid-1978 and the upward trend on the 
world market was further accentuated in 1978, 
thus largely explaining the higher value of 
exports of both concentrates and oxide. 
Finally, exports of unworked wood have 
increased rapidly, especially in the last year, 
and the prospects seem to indicate that this 
tendency will continue. 
1 4 The "Others" group in table 4 contain mining and 
agricultural exports which, together, represent about one-
quarter of this group. 
1 5This means that when 20 million dollars of concen-
trate are converted into molybdenum oxide in Chile and 
exported in this form, exports of the "traditional" product 
molybdenum go down by 20 million dollars and those of 
the "non-traditional" product molybdenum oxide go up by 
be tween 21 and 22 million dollars, so that the net balance, 
in the case of the example given, would not come to more 
than 2 million dollars of value added. The value added at 
international prices depends on the situation of the ex-
ternal markets: sometimes the gap between the prices for 
the two products increases considerably, especially in the 
case of sales of marginal volumes. 
Table 6 also shows the evolution of the 
"Rest" category of exports of manufactures, 
which includes a great many items, some of 
them with high levels of processing. Their 
evolution could be an indication of the future 
behaviour of industrial exports proper. The 
annual growth rates of this group of exports 
were as follows: 16% per year in 1965-1970; 
15% in 1974;16 40% in 1975; 48% in 1976, and 
3% in 1977 and 1978. 
The decline in the growth rate of non-
traditional exports and exports in the "Rest" 
category of industrial products is to be ex-
plained by the behaviour of a certain market of 
destination: the same one which grew fastest 
between 1974 and 1976. 
3. Markets of destination 
During the period under consideration, there 
was an expansion in exports to all regions 
of the world. Marked diversification thus 
occurred, with the appearance of many new 
markets of destination. 
It was the sales to the Andean Pact market 
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Ve-
nezuela) which recorded the biggest expan-
sion, particularly in the two-year period 1975-
1976. During these two years, the Andean 
market absorbed 37% of the increase in all non-
traditional exports, as shown in tables 7 and 8. 
In the case of the "Others" category of non-
traditional exports, the share of this market in 
the expansion rose to 42%. Thus, the contribu-
tion of the Andean Pact market to the expansion 
of new exports was very significant, especially 
as regards manufactures, for in 1976 over half 
the total metal products and machinery exports 
went to the Andean Pact countries. The rapid 
expansion of these exports came to an abrupt 
halt, however, with Chile's withdrawal from 
the Andean Pact in October 1976.17 Indeed, in 
the following years Chile's (real) non-tradi-
tional exports to this market went down by 2% 
1 6 The total growth rate with respect to 1970 was 
assigned to 1974. 
17
 An analysis of the reasons for Chile's withdrawal 
and the economic costs which this had for the country is 
given in R. Ffrench-Davis, "Pacto Andino y librecam-
bismo", in Mensaje, Santiago, October 1976, and Estudios 
Internacionales, Buenos Aires, April-June 1977. 
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Table 6 
INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars at 1977 prices) 






































































2 7 9 . * 
Source; Central Bank, Balanza de Pagos, up to 1975; Boletín Mensual and Embarques, 1976-1978. 
"Comprises Monterey pine and other woods, unsawn or simply worked. 
b
 Excludes re-exports of sugar, which amounted to US« 42.5 million in 1975, US$ 12.4 million in 1977, and US$ 9.9 
million in 1978. 
Table 7 
MARKETS OF DESTINATION OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars at 1977 prices) 
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ie las exportaciones chilenas: 

























































( -1 .2) 
and 12%, respectively (see table 7). The signifi-
cance of the Andean market for Chile is even 
greater if exports based on the intensive use of 
natural resources are excluded, as the advan-
tages given by the preferential access to this 
market have less incidence in this case. 
The diversification of markets is reflected 
in the expansion of the "Rest" group, which 
included some 70 countries in 1977. Despite 
the increase in this number of countries and 
Chile 's withdrawal from the Cartagena Agree-
ment, however, the Andean Group countries 
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Table 8 
SHARE OF EACH MARKET IN THE GROWTH OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS 
(Millions of dollars at 1977 prices) 

















































































































Source: Table 7. 
still had more weight than the "Rest" in 1977, 
although the difference between the two 
groups of countries, which was extremely 
marked between 1974 and 1976, was dras-
tically reduced after Chile withdrew from this 
integration scheme, and the proportion was 
reversed in 1978. 
To sum up, the loss of the formal and 
informal preferential treatment which Chile 
had enjoyed in the most dynamic of its markets 
of destination had negative repercussions on 
the exports involving the highest degree of 
processing (or value added on the natural 
resource component), which are those forming 
the majority of the "Others" group of non-
traditional exports and the "Rest" group in 
exports of manufactures. 
I l l 
Effects of exports and future prospects 
The external and internal economic framework 
within which the export process has been 
carried out has influenced the behaviour of this 
variable, and the explicit consideration of this 
framework makes it possible to appraise both 
the effects which exports could have had on 
national development and the future prospects 
which they may offer. 
1. The economic framework 
The external situation faced by exports un-
doubtedly influences their evolution. Since 
1975, conditions on international markets have 
become more unfavourable for the expansion 
of the exports of non-oil-exporting developing 
countries, and this has naturally also affected 
Chile in various export lines. 
The domestic context, for its part, shows a 
number of outstanding changes. Although most 
of these had a negative effect on the national 
economy and the development of the country, 
some of them, such as the depression of 
domestic demand and the deterioration of 
wages, did facilitate the expansion of exports. 
Among the features which have negatively 
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influenced exports, apart from the withdrawal 
from the Andean Pact, are the absence of 
economic growth in these five years and the 
low level of domestic investment.18 
The Chilean economy has suffered a 
serious depression in effective demand, caused 
mainly by the way economic policy has been 
run.18 After some degree of "normalization" of 
economic activity during the first year of 
application of the current model, a sharp drop 
in demand led to a 13% fall in the per capita 
gross domestic product in 1975.20 
In the following three years, the official 
figures show a significant reactivation, but it 
must be repeated that the per capita GDP has 
still not recovered the level of 1974. In other 
words, the effective production of the country 
has not grown during the five years of applica-
tion of the present economic model, so that the 
increase in exports has been achieved either 
through a change in the composition of the 
GDP, or at the expense of domestic consump-
tion, or thanks to the under-utilization of the 
installed capacity for the domestic market 
caused by the economic policy. These three 
factors are present, although in different pro-
portions, in many of the new exports; two 
significant cases will be examined later. 
In the labour field, on the one hand trade 
union activity has been drastically restricted, 
while on the other open unemployment rose 
from historical levels of the order of 6% to 
around 20% of the labour force in 1975. Sub-
sequently, the employment situation improved 
a little, and since the end of 1976 the un-
employment has been around 13%, but even so 
this is over double the- unemployment rate of 
1 8 The fact that there was some investment in the 
production of exportable goods does not signify a contradic-
tion with this statement, as will be shown later. 
1 8See J. Ramos, "E l costo social: hechos e interpre-
taciones" in Estudios de Economía, University of Chile, 
Santiago, second half of 1975, and A. Foxley, "Inflación 
con recesión: las experiencias de Brasil y Chile" in 
Colección Estudios CIEPLAN, N.° 1, Santiago, 1979. 
^ T h e s e are official ODEPLAN estimates, reproduced 
in issues of the Boletín Mensual of the Central Bank. The 
figures refer to the concept of GDP expenditure; that is to 
say, the loss of income recorded in 1975 due to the 
deterioration in the terms of trade caused by the drop in 
the price of copper and the rise in the price of oil has been 
deduc ted from them. 
the previous five-year period.21 Finally, wages 
underwent a marked drop in real terms in 1974, 
and although by 1978 they had gradually 
recovered according to the official index of 
wages and salaries, their levels was still only 
close to that of 1970. Over the last five years, the 
ratio of the exchange rate to wages was favour-
able to the former, thus raising the profitability 
of exports. From a purely economic point of 
view, and in the short run, these three aspects 
—repression of trade union activity, unemploy-
ment and low wages— facilitated the expan-
sion of the export sector. 
Lastly, investment was at a depressed 
level throughout the period. In 1978 —once 
again according to the official figures of 
ODEPLAN— gross fixed domestic investment 
amounted to less than 12% of the GDP. This 
percentage is markedly below historical levels, 
and is barely enough to compensate for the 
attrition of the stock of capital. In reality, after 
five years neither foreign direct investment nor 
domestic private investment have come up to 
the expectations of the supporters of the eco-
nomic model. Regardless of the political and 
economic system followed by Chile, there can 
be no doubt that an increase in investment is 
essential if the rapid expansion of exports as a 
whole is to be supported and the effective 
growth of production is to be reinitiated. 
2. Origin of exports 
As already noted, an increase in exports may be 
due to greater utilization of production capaci-
ty, an increase in such capacity, or a reduction 
in domestic consumption.22 
Although the depression in the domestic 
market had negative economic and social con-
2 1 These figures are taken from the data published 
quaterly by the Department of Economics of the Universi-
ty of Chile, which refer to the city of Santiago, where 
approximately 40% of the economically active population 
live. Unemployment in the rest of the urban centres of the 
country is even greater, according to surveys by the same 
institution and by the National Statistical Institute (INE) 
covering the years 1977 and 1978. 
^ A n expansion in exports can also derive from an 
increase in sale prices greater than the increase in the index 
of external prices used to deflate all the monetary values, or 
from a change in the structure of consumption. 
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sequences, it facilitated the increase in exports. 
From another angle, the expansion in exports 
provided an outlet for production surpluses 
which would otherwise not have found a 
market, because the excessive restriction of 
domestic demand, particularly during the 
period from mid-1974 to 1976, left a significant 
proportion of Chile's economic activities with 
under-utilized production capacity. The simul-
taneous existence of a rising real exchange rate 
and the access to the Andean market during this 
period made it possible to provide an outlet 
for part of these production surpluses. 
Broadly speaking, then, it can be said that 
in these circumstances the expansion of non-
traditional exports made it possible to increase 
the efficiency of assignment of resources, 
mainly through increasing their rate of utiliza-
tion. During a period of shortage of foreign 
exchange, as was the case in 1975, the new 
exports also helped to reduce the severity of the 
bottleneck brought about by the balance-of-
payments situation that year, and subsequently 
the expansion of exports tended to make it 
easier to obtain external credit. 
Naturally, the subsequent reactivation of 
domestic demand tends to bring about the 
opposite effect as regards the exportable 
surplus, since it helps to reduce the volume of 
exports. The symmetry in this case is only 
partial, however, since Chile's export potential 
was insufficiently utilized at the beginning of 
the period. It is therefore likely that a consider-
able proportion of the exports facilitated by the 
1974-1976 depression will continue to be avail-
able afterwards, although their growth rate will 
not be as high as in those years. 
The production capacity of the national 
economy as a whole has stagnated during the 
last six years, although its composition has 
tended to change in favour of certain export 
activities. This process has been slow and 
limited because of the scanty dynamism of the 
national economy, since the restructuring of 
production capacity is easier in an economy 
which is growing rapidly and has a high rate of 
investment. Neither of these two conditions 
was present during the period under consider-
ation. The export incentives did, however, 
encourage some investment in this activity and 
the production capacity of some sectors was 
increased.23 Among the new investments, 
reference may be made to one substantial 
investment project, completed in 1978, which 
was carried out by the State-owned steel 
company (CAP) and was designed to produce 
pellets from domestic iron ore. 
Another two areas in which investment 
was significant during recent years are planta-
tions of timber trees and orchards and vine-
yards. Approximately half of the planting of 
timber trees was carried out directly by the 
State, while 75% of the cost of the investment 
made by the private sector in this field were 
covered by subsidies. Both ways of promoting 
investment constitute exceptional situations in 
view of the economic model, and indeed it was 
announced that direct public sector investment 
in forestry activities would be terminated as of 
1979. 
Between 1968 and 1972 quite large plan-
tations of orchards and vineyards were carried 
out under the encouragement of the fruit-
growing development plan then in force, and 
thanks to selective credits, the construction of 
fruit packing centres, and investments in areas 
affected by the process of agrarian reform, there 
was an increase of 60% in the area planted with 
fruit trees and vineyards between 1965 and 
1974.24 Since 1976 this type of investment has 
regained importance and is increasing. Recent 
plantations have been carried out and financed 
mainly by the private sector and are located in 
many medium-sized units in various regions of 
the country. It goes without saying that the 
expansion recorded up to 1978 in exports was 
not due to these more recent investments, 
because of the period needed for these planta-
tions to come into production. Moreover, in the 
case of plantations of timber trees, the period is 
much longer: Monterey pine, for example, 
takes between 18 and 25 years to reach its opti-
mum point for exploitation as timber. Conse-
As the net domestic investment has been insignif-
icant in macro-economic terms, part of the depreciation of 
other production sectors has been reinvested in export 
activities. There has also been some conversion prompted 
by the big changes in relative profitability generated by the 
economic policy. 
^ F i g u r e s quoted in J. Franco Mesa, "El desarrollo 
agrícola en el período de reformas", Mensaje, N.° 274, 
November 1978. 
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quently, the expansion of exports in recent 
years has been due to investment made before 
1973, although the substantial investments 
made in both fields in the following five years 
will make possible future exports. 
In order to identify more accurately the 
sources of the expansion of exports, it would be 
neccessary to have information on the produc-
tion (and/or domestic consumption) and in-
vestment recorded in the various export fields. 
This information is unfortunately very scanty 
and often deficient in quality, but some data are 
available on certain sectors. The information 
below refers to two items: would pulp and 
timber. 
The production of wood pulp acquired 
importance during the past decade, when there 
was a considerable increase in the value of 
exports of this item. Its expansion was more 
marked between 1974 and 1977, however, 
when wood pulp alone accounted for one-
seventh of all industrial exports. This expan-
sion was due to the initiation of production at 
two wood pulp plants promoted by the public 
sector in the 1960s and scheduled to begin 
activities in 1972 and 1973, respectively, al-
though in actual fact they began commercial 
production in 1974 and 1976. The exports by 
these two plants, which came to US$ 54 million 
in 1977, account for practically all the real 
expansion in this item since 1974. 
Exports of timber comprise two main com-
ponents: sawn wood and roundwood (trunks). 
Information on the production of sawn wood is 
much scantier because of the large number of 
sawmills where it is cut. At all events, the 
available figures indicate that the installed 
capacity is much greater than the actual pro-
duction, so that, within certain margins of sale 
prices, the production depends to a decisive 
extent on demand. 
Domestic demand for wood is very sensi-
tive to the level of activity in the construction of 
dwellings and the manufacture of furniture. 
Both sectors have been in markedly depressed 
conditions, both with respect to 1974 (a year of 
intense activity in construction) and in com-
parison with immediately preceding years. 
Thus, consumption of sawn wood in Chile in 
1977 is estimated to have been 35% below the 
average for the period 1970-1974. The volume 
of exports, in contrast, increased about five-
fold.25 This expansion made it possible to 
compensate for the drop in domestic demand 
and provide an additional market for an in-
crease in production of around 30%. The 
increased exports are therefore due, in relative-
ly similar proportions, to a reduction in domes-
tic demand and an increase in production. 
Sawn wood represents about 10% of non-
traditional exports, an sawn wood and wood 
pulp together amount to a quarter of total 
exports of manufactures.26 Consequently, in 
view of their significant weight in exports, the 
information on these two items gives a picture 
of the behaviour of an important segment of the 
increased national exports, their production 
and their domestic consumption. 
Moreover, what happened in the forestry 
sector suggests the direction of the predom-
inant trend which will be followed by exports 
under the current model. The production of 
wood pulp —i.e., a processed forest product— 
increased because of the existence of establis-
ments whose construction was decided upon 
and begun in the 1960s. This means that any 
further expansion of the installed capacity is 
subject to new investments, which are not 
under way and which, even when made, would 
require a long lead time. The item with the 
highest growth rate in 1977 was sawn wood, 
which has a very low level of processing. 
Moreover, the most dynamic item in 1978 was 
roundwood, which does not require any pro-
cessing at all.27 In short, a tendency is visible 
towards an increasing preponderance of ex-
ports which make intensive use of natural 
resources with a generally decreasing level of 
processing.28 This hypothesis is backed up by 
the notably slower growth displayed in 1977 
and 1978 by exports in the "Rest" section of 
industrial goods (table 6). 
2 5 The increase in value in real terms was 250%. 
2 6 The ISIC classification lists simply worked wood as 
an industrial product, in spite of its minimal degree of 
processing. 
2 7Exports of roundwood began in 1976 after the 
prohibition which had previously prevented them had 
been lifted. This item, too, is included under industrial 
exports. 
2 8 There are items involving a higher grade of proces-
sing in which investments are in progress, such as paper: 
this is why we are speaking of tendencies and averages. 
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3. Some comparisons with the experience 
of other countries 
A comparative analysis with the experience of 
other countries involves very great difficulties 
because of the large number of variables 
affecting the behaviour of exports and the 
solidity of national development.29 However, 
comparison of some basic data does serve to 
demostrate that export promotion can be incor-
porated in models which are very different 
from each other and that the promotional effort 
does not of itself ensure sustained devel-
opment. 
In the case of two countries —Brazil and 
South Korea— which were successful in ex-
panding their exports over a long period, this 
expansion took place in conjunction with a 
significant increase in the national product and 
in the investment rate (table 9).3(J Regardless of 
the nature of the causal relationship between 
these variables, there can be no doubt that the 
three phenomena mutually support each other. 
The increased exports were concentrated in 
manufactures, especially in South Korea (a 
country which does not possess abundant 
natural resources), and the expansion in ex-
ports was accompanied by vigorous develop-
ment of industrial production. In both coun-
tries, export promotion included numerous 
incentives, and it did not involve any indis-
criminate liberalization of imports. 
The expansion of South Korean exports, 
which began from insignificant levels, is con-
centrated on labour-intensive manufactures. 
2 9An additional problem arises from the considerable 
differences between different sources of information and 
the marked influence exerted by the period selected for 
study in each case. 
^°Recent analyses on South Korea are given in Ch. 
Frank and others, "Foreign Trade Régimes and Economic 
Development: South Korea", New York, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 1975, and in Balassa, op. cit., 
chapters 8 and 9. With regard to Brazil, see E. Bacha, 
"Issues and evidence on recent Brazilian economic 
growth", and P. Malan and R. Bonelli, "The Brazilian 
economy in the seventies: old and new developments", in 
World Development, January-February 1977; H. Garcia, 
"La política de promoción de exportaciones de manufac-
turas en Brasil"; CEPAL (éd.) Políticas de promoción de 
exportaciones, Santiago, Chile, 1978, Vol. V; and A. 
Fishlow, "Foreign trade régimes and economic devel-
opment: Brazil" (mimeo), 1976. 
The growth in these exports has been extra-
ordinarily rapid: between 1963 and 1973 real 
total exports grew at a cumulative rate of almost 
40% per year, and manufactures amounted to 
88% of total exports in 1973.31 The main market 
for the new exports was the United States, 
followed by Japan. At the same time that 
exports were expanding, the gross domestic 
product also grew rapidly at rates of the order 
of 10% per year during a whole decade. 
As regards import policy, it should be 
noted that export incentives were used which 
meant that the effective exchange rate tended 
to be relatively equivalent to that correspon-
ding to imports in the same line. That is to say, 
the protection for exports and for import subs-
titutes was, on average, relatively similar. This 
took place, however, within the context of 
differentiated protective tariffs whose levels 
ranged from 0 to 15%, a substantial proportion 
of the items being located between 30 and 
60%.32 Although a certain proportion of these 
tariffs were redundant, the fact remains that 
export promotion in South Korea is not carried 
out in a traditional context of free trade.33 
In the case of Brazil, which also achieved 
noteworthy expansion of its production and 
exports, its real total exports grew at the rate of 
9% per year between 1963 and 1973, while 
exports of manufactures grew by 23% per year. 
The most important market for the new exports, 
especially for machinery and transport equip-
ment, was the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA). In contrast, the markets 
of the develped countries are of greater relative 
importance for exports of industries making 
intensive use of raw materials (foodstuffs, 
footwear, wood, textiles). The expansion of 
exports took place against the background of a 
3 1 See Ch. Frank and others, ibid., table 6.1. It should 
be borne in mind that the use of 1973 as the terminal year 
tends to overestimate the rate of increase because of the 
conditions then prevailing in the international market. 
3 2 B . Balassa, op. cit., table 9.4. 
3 3 I n the specific field of exports, as well as direct 
monetary incentives there are other incentives connected 
with government attitudes and methods. Thus, for ex-
ample, firms which fulfil the goals of the national export 
plan "receive more favourable treatment from tax inspec-
tors, which is an important incentive in a country where the 
effective rates of taxes are fixed through administrative 
procedures rather than by law". Ch. Frank, op. cit., p. 233. 
Of course, this is not the best promotion mechanism. 
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Table 9 






























































Sources: South Korea: Ch. Frank and others, op. cit., tables 2.4 to 2.8 and 6.2; B. Balassa, op. cit., p. 132. 
Brazil: H. Garcia, op. cit., tables 7 and 8; A. Fishlow, op. cit., Tables A.I and A.III. Column (4) includes 
manufactures and semimanufactures, and the asterisk indicates that the figures refer to the period 1964-1969. 
Figures for the period 1970-1975 were added to show the situation alter the world trade boom which came to 
an end in 1974. 
Chile: Columns (1) and (2) were calculated on the basis of official ODEPLAN estimates; column (3) comes 
from the index published by the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF), and columns (4) and (5) have the same 
sQurces as tables 4 and 6. In columns (2) to (5),a measures the annual rate of variation with respect to the actual 
value for 1973, while1' estimates the "normal" level for 1973 on the basis of the actual values for 1970-1971. 
Note: Column (1) measures the gross domestic fixed capital investment as a proportion of the gross national product 
(GNP). Columns (2) to (5) indicate the cumulative annual rate of variation for each period. 
significant increase in the gross domestic pro-
duct, which increased at the rate of 8% per year 
between 1963 and 1973. The import policy, 
like that referred to in the case of South Korea, 
also differs from the traditional free trade 
recipe; although the restrictions on trade were 
reduced, many manufactures are protected by 
import tariffs of the order of 80%. 
A comparative evaluation of the experien-
ce of the three countries in question would 
require a great deal of additional information in 
order to answer such questions as that of the 
role played by the restrictions on political and 
trade union activities, the differences in per-
sonal and regional income distribution, the 
implications of the special relationship be-
tween South Korea and the United States, and 
the role of foreign direct investment and finan-
cial capital. The features described, however, 
do exemplify some key aspects which reveal 
differences between these two cases and that of 
Chile. 
The present economic policy has only 
been in force in Chile for a few years, so it 
would be dangerous to try to draw definite 
conclusions from it. However, probable ten-
dencies can be determined if the first five years 
of the application of this policy are compared 
with the first live years of the policies in force 
in South Korea and Brazil.34 
Table 9 shows the basic macro-economic 
background information for the three coun-
tries, in values of constant purchasing power: 
annual growth rates of the gross national pro-
^For the purpose of this comparison, 1964 was 
selected as the starting date of both experiences. 
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duct (GNP, column 1), gross domestic invest-' 
ment as a proportion of GNP for each five-year 
period (column 2); and annual growth rates of 
manufacturing production (column 3), total 
exports (column 4) and industrial exports (co-
lumn 5). In the case of Brazil and South Korea, 
figures are also given on the second five-year 
period of the models in force. 
The most outstanding quantitative dif-
ferences lie in the positive evolution of invest-
ment, industrial production and GNP during 
the first five years of the Korean and Brazilian 
experiencies, in contrast with the evolution of 
the same variables in the Chilean case. The 
behaviour of industrial and non-traditional 
exports of Chile for the five-year period as a 
whole was very satisfactory and was compar-
able with Brazil, but the differences become 
noticeable when the evolution of exports 
during the five-year period are examined. In 
Brazil and South Korea the tendency is main-
tained beyond the first five-year period and 
shows a rising trend for products with a higher 
degree of processing, whereas in Chile the last 
two years show a downward tendency and the 
reversal of trends is most accentuated for 
exports with a higher degree of processing. 
Thus, the extrapolation of the prevailing 
policies and of the present tendency of their 
effects indicates that Chilean exports will 
contribute to industrial development on a 
markedly more modest scale than in the other 
two cases. This is connected with the scanty 
investment recorded during the five-year 
period, the passivity of the public sector in line 
with the ideology of the official economic team, 
and the incidence of the rapid liberalization of 
imports on the demand for domestic manufac-
tures. In these three aspects, the Chilean 
experience is different from those of South 
Korea and Brazil. 
This comparison with Brazil and South 
Korea does not seek to present these as cases 
which should be imitated: from both a political 
and an economic point of view this is un-
feasible and/or undesirable for a country like 
Chile.35 At all events, however, it is worth 
repeating that, in the case of the first two 
countries, efforts were made to adapt economic 
policies to national realities, and this has not 
been done in the case of the extremely ortho-
dox model imposed in Chile. 
IV 
Final considerations 
Chile's exports of primary commodities and 
industrial goods have increased at a rapid rate 
in recent years, this phenomenon being par-
ticularly intense during the period 1973-1976. 
During these years, the expansion of non-
traditional exports helped to reduce the nega-
tive effects of the sharp restriction in effective 
demand which resulted from the extreme 
monetarist approach used to combat first of all 
the inflationary process and secondly the 
balance-of-payments deficit faced by the Chi-
lean economy. 
The increase in exports was praiseworthy 
because it took place in a context of scanty 
investment and an economy which was in a 
state of stagnation during the entire five-year 
period; from this point of view, the promotion 
of exports is one of the few positive aspects that 
the economic policy which has prevailed 
during the last five years can point to. To sump 
up, the current policy has been successful in 
the export sector, but so far it has been a failure 
as regards the creation of new production 
capacity and the generation of employment, 
despite the virtually unlimited powers which 
its executants have enjoyed.36 
3 5 See , for example, Ch. Frank and others, op. cit., 
especially pages 240-244, for more specific details of the 
Korean case. 
3 6
 It should be remembered that we are not analysing 
here other characteristics of the current model such as the 
concentration of income recorded during these years, nor 
are we analysing the achievements registered in the 
reduction of inflation or the errors committed in this effort. 
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In studies on import substitution, a great 
deal has been written about the "easy" stage of 
the process, and there is likewise an initial 
"easy" stage in the promotion of the exports of 
semi-industrialized economies. This not to 
belittle the merits of either of these processes: 
on the contrary, these stages involve low costs 
and high benefits, so that it is clearly desirable 
to carry them out, The expansion of non-
traditional exports in recent years generally 
falls within this stage, for it has been based on 
the use of abundant natural resources and 
under-utilized installed capacity. The under-
utilization characteristic of excessively protect-
ed import substitution processes was accen-
tuated by the big depression in domestic 
demand, and this situation enabled exports to 
be expanded without capital investment or 
with relatively modest investments in some 
lines of production. 
The factors mentioned —availability of 
natural resources and under-utilized produc-
tion capacity— constituted conditions which 
were necessary, but were not sufficient on their 
own. In order to achieve greater exports, two 
additional factors entered into the situation: on 
the one hand, an exchange policy was applied 
which, despite contradictory movements in 
1976-1977, provided marked support for non-
traditional exports,37 and secondly, Chile's 
membership of the Andean Pact gave an ex-
panded market for nearly 40% of the increase in 
new exports. 
Except in a few cases due exclusively to 
the depression of domestic demand, most 
(although not all) of the new exports, generally 
speaking, tend to coincide more or less with the 
exports that other models would have develop-
ed too.38 In this respect —and this is worth 
repeating— the promotion of exports is not an 
exclusive feature of the current Chilean model, 
and an alternative concept would also have 
tried to make use of the valuable natural 
3 7 T h e exchange rate is the same for all exports, but the 
non-traditional exports are much more sensitive to the level 
and stability of the exchange rate than other products such 
as copper and iron ore. 
3 8 See , for example, S. Bitar, "Hacia la definición de 
una estrategia industrial", in O. Muñoz, éd., Proceso a la 
industrialización chilena, Santiago, Editorial Nueva Uni-
versidad, 1972, pp. 226-229. 
resources and the under-utilized installed ca-
pacity. The substantial differences between 
the current model and the possible alternative 
lie in other aspects: in the nature of the action 
designed to back up future expansion; in the 
role of exports whose "comparative advan-
tages" lie in variables other than and/or ad-
ditional to abundant natural resources; and the 
measures taken to increase the multiplier effect 
on the national economy and the degree of 
autonomy with respect to the exterior. 
In order to support the expansion of ex-
ports it is necessary to increase national invest-
ment. The theoretical conception on which the 
policy of the present Chilean economic team is 
based holds that resources should be oriented 
towards "comparative advantages" and that the 
play of market forces, free of State interference, 
will secure this objective. This theoretical 
version, which constitutes an extreme among 
the various economic approaches existing at 
present, involves an idealized and simple 
conception of "comparative advantages". In 
reality, the problem is that comparative market 
advantages depend on the level and stability of 
the exchange rate, the level of activity of the 
domestic and international economies, the 
fluctuations in external prices, the imbalances 
and distortions which are characteristic of 
developing economies, and many other factors 
—especially indirect effects and dynamic con-
siderations— which provide theoretical and 
pragmatic justification for external trade policy 
seeking to protect domestic production on a 
selective basis and actively regulate the 
market.39 This regulation should be aimed at 
increasing the social efficiency and volume of 
investment. The current model has shown 
unsatisfactory results in both respects: the rate 
of investment has been very low, and a high 
proportion of such investment as has been 
made has been in luxury goods and services. 
Brief mention may be made here of some 
requisites which are necessary in order for 
exports to make a significant contribution to 
national development. 
3 9A theoretical analysis which backs up this alternative 
approach is given in R. Ffrench-Davis, Economía interna-
cional: teorías y políticas para el desarrollo, Mexico City, 
Fondo d e Cultura Económica, 1979, chapters IV and VII. 
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Firstly, import substitution and export 
promotion are not essentially antagonistic ob-
jectives. On the contrary, industrial develop-
ment can benefit from the dynamic comple-
mentation of both policies: a promotion strate-
gy of this type requires a selective import 
substitution policy instead of free trade or 
arbitrary and excessive protectionism. 
Secondly, many industrial exports can be 
promoted through the preferential access 
offered by integration process and production 
agreements with other developing countries: 
Chile 's presence in the Andean Pact clearly 
illustrated this possibility. 
Thirdly, exports do not necessarily absorb 
more labour than import substitution, since 
there is a broad range of different characteris-
tics within both categories: in practice, the 
contribution to productive employment de-
pends on the structure of each one, so that a 
suitably selective economic policy can make it 
possible to improve the contribution of the 
external sector to employment. An active role 
in this must be given to indirect instruments 
(the profile of import tariffs and export incen-
tive and the stability of exchange rate policy) 
and to the direct action of State bodies on 
investment and demand. 
Fourthly, the organization and leadership 
capacity of the State can have a decisive 
influence on the durability of the exports 
process: whether this process is self-sustaining 
or not depends on the repercussions it trans-
mits to other sectors of the economy. In or-
der for exports to become one of the driving 
forces of development, they must be integrated 
in the national economy: i.e., they must either 
complement import substitution, or generate 
surpluses which are invested in productive 
activities in the country, or create a demand for 
domestic resources, or promote the expansion 
of technological know-how. Lastly, the con-
tinuation and expansion of external markets 
requires the State to play an active part in 
international meetings, in negotiations with 
the transnational corporations, and in the ima-
ginative search for new forms of interrelations 
with other developing countries. 
